Placement of Security Devices in Cloud Data Centre Network: Analysis and Implementation  by Majhi, Santosh Kumar & Dhal, Sunil Kumar
 Procedia Computer Science  78 ( 2016 )  33 – 39 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877-0509 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the ICISP2015
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2016.02.007 
ScienceDirect
International Conference on Information Security & Privacy (ICISP2015), 11-12 December 2015, 
Nagpur, INDIA 
Placement of Security Devices in Cloud Data Centre Network: 
Analysis and Implementation 
Santosh Kumar Majhia,b,*, Sunil Kumar Dhalb 
aVeer Surendra Sai University of Technology, Odisha-768018, India 
bSri Sri University, Odisha, India 
Abstract 
Due to extensive use of Cloud services and newly evolving security threats, most cloud service providers (CSP) 
deploy varieties of security devices such as, firewalls, IPSec, IDS, etc. for controlling resource accesses based on the 
data centre security requirements. Today CSPs are looking for systematically hardening the security by 
incorporating multiple security devices in the network in a cost-effective way. In this paper, we present an 
automated framework for synthesizing data centre security configurations. We take a dummy data centre topology, 
CSP security (connectivity and isolation) requirements and business constraints (usability and cost) as input; and 
then synthesizes the correct and optimal  data centre security. It determines the optimal placement of different 
security devices in the data centre. 
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
Cloud data centre security consists of the provisions and policies adopted by an administrator to prevent and monitor 
unauthorized access, misuse, modification, or denial of a computer network and network-accessible resources. Now 
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days the service providers are more concerned with their security along with their products. These are becoming 
more fine-grained due to extensive use of various cloud services and newly evolving security threats. In addition to 
this, most of the organizations not only emphasizing on enforcement of the security constraints but also requiring 
satisfaction of different business constraints like, cost, usability demand, etc. The implementation of strong defence 
in a cloud data centre exploring different security design alternatives as well as resolving the contention between the 
security and business constraints is an important but challenging problem.  
 
Usually, the cloud service provider security requirements cover: (i) connectivity requirement that defines the service 
flows between various data centre devices; and (ii) partition or separation requirement that defines various partition 
patterns as combination of different security devices (firewall, IPSec, IDS, and NAT etc.) and their relative 
arrangements based on the security enabling device capability. A partition pattern signifies the level of security 
resistance, for example, traffic filtering (firewall), IPSec based encryption, payload traffic inspection (IDS), hiding 
traffic source identity (NAT) and/or combination of these constraints. 
 
On the other hand, the service provider business constraints include service usage and cost of service. Installation of 
different security enabling devices significantly affects these constraints. For example, implementing both IPSec and 
IDS instead of firewall might cause some usable application inaccessible from a server, thereby reducing the service 
usability. The major requirement is to find usable data centre security configuration by exploring various security 
design alternatives (partition levels) that increases the service usability without significant degradation of the overall 
data centre security. At the same time, it is required to find best security partition in affordable cost. Therefore, a 
careful balancing between the security and business constraints is required to determine correct and cost-effective 
data centre security configurations.                                        
 
In our work we consider only the placement of security devices between servers is defined using four partition 
patterns - Firewall, IPSec, IDS and NAT – to meet the security needs in cost effective manner. In other words, 
optimized placement of devices with minimum cost requirements is described here. Now, let us understand the 
partition patterns and working of them (firewall, IPSec, IDS, and NAT).  
 
2. Partition 
Data centre administrators can define partition patterns considering different combination of security devices 
(primitive partition s). They can objectively exclude some of the device combinations according to requirements or 
domain knowledge of Cloud data centre. Administrators can also define the capability of different partition patterns 
by providing relative arrangement of these patterns. Now, we formalize the network partition as a set of rules, 
{ir1,…,irn}, where, each partition  rule iri is formally represented as follows:  
irk: (src = i) ר(dst = j) ר(service = x) ֜  
 
The decision variable,  = 1 indicates that the corresponding kth partition  pattern is required to be deployed 
between node pair (i; j) under service x. Here, k represents the relative arrangement order of the partition  pattern. A 
possible set of primitive partition patterns with their relative order is presented in Table 1. It shows that k = 1 for 
“firewall Deny” and k = 3 for “IPSec based authentication”, etc. So, if  = 1, then the service x must be denied 
between the node pair (i, j) through firewall. 
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Table 1: Partition Patterns 
Partition  Order Partition  Pattern Decision 
Variable
Symbol Used 
1 Firewall Deny 
2 IPSec Encryption 
3 Payload Inspection (IDS) 
4 Source Identity Hiding 
(NAT) 
Other symbols used for client is and router  is 
3. Placement of Security Devices 
Here, we consider a dummy data centre topology, organizational security (connectivity and partition ) requirements 
and business constraints (usability and cost) as input; and then synthesizes the correct and optimal security 
configurations that maximizes partition  while satisfying the requirements.  
Here the algorithm generates a correct and cost-effective network security configuration (partition patterns between 
each pair of nodes) using constraint satisfaction checking. However, the optimal placement of security devices in the 
network may not be determined based on the partition results. This is because of the fact that there may have similar 
types of partition (say, firewall) between a sources i and multiple destinations j, which signifies to deploy multiple 
firewalls between all such node pairs. This placement might not be optimal as in that case, a single firewall might be 
sufficient to place at the source i. Therefore, given partition patterns for each pair of nodes in the network, it is 
required to find minimum number of devices for enforcing the security constraints. We need to present a procedural 
approach for determining optimal placement of the security devices. 
 
Partition Equivalence Cluster Creation: This process logically combines all nodes, j with similar partition 
configuration with respect to a specific node i into a single network cluster. 
 
Node Partition Equivalence Cluster :An Partition  Equivalence Cluster , is defined as a logical collection of 
servers which have same partition  value with respect to a node i under partition  pattern k. 
An partition cluster with respect to a node i under partition pattern k is represented as follows: 
 = UjɽN {j|  = 1} 
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We procedurally create the partition equivalence cluster with respect to each node i in the network. 
Now, multiple partition clusters may contain overlapping member nodes. Thus, these clusters should be further 
combined to group the nodes optimally in terms of partition s. This is done by creating different partition partite 
classes based on the similarity in cluster members. 
Partition Partite Class: An Partition Partite Class,  is defined as logical collection of partition clusters  w.r.t a 
cluster  such that +ك + and the node x does not belong to . Here, in +, the plus sign indicates that the 
clusters cannot be empty if they are going to take part in the formation of the partition partite class. 
The partite class  is formally represented as follows: 
 = Ux{(  | )ك ٿ ¬(x א )} 
This process signifies reducing the redundancies between the partition  clusters. Each partition  class has two 
parties; the suffix sequence (here, i אN and xאN) of the class, the left partite(nodes that will belong in the left 
group of the partition  device); and the participating clusters of class  represent right partite. 
It is to be noted that, if the node, x belongs to the corresponding determine partition cluster, , then x is not 
included in the class, .  
 
This is because of the fact that there may exist an partition (of same pattern k) between the node x and the other 
member nodes of the cluster, . After creating different partite classes, we procedurally determine the security 
device placement between different clusters under the partite classes. The pseudo code of this process is presented in 
Algorithm 2. 
Before the implementation of algorithm we need to know the input and output patterns. Input pattern is of .csv 
extension files, i.e. comma separated values and the output file is of .txt extension, i.e. text file. 
The output file is in the format which is read by graphviz application and a corresponding graph according to the 
nodes, clusters, classes and partition patterns is drawn for better visualization.  
In input file, i.e. .csv file we enter the cluster number and the number of nodes in it with varying partition  patterns. 
For example, suppose we have two clusters C1 and C2 having 3,4,5 and 4,5 as their corresponding nodes between 
which partition  patterns 2,3 and 1,2 are required respectively. So, in .csv file we write them as 1,2,3,0,3,4,5,-1 and 
2,4,5,0,4,5,-1. Here, 0 indicates that the following digits are meant to be read as nodes and -1 is the termination of a 
single line (i.e. details of a cluster is complete). At the end of file we put a $ sign to indicate the end of file.  
Algorithm 1: Class creation
1. Select initial cluster and count its number of nodes in it. 
2. Check the other clusters, except the initial one, which have less or equal ‘number of nodes’ as the initial 
one. 
3. Once step 2 is satisfied, check if the ‘nodes’ in initial one matches exactly with the next corresponding 
clusters. 
4. If step 3 is satisfied check for their similar partition patterns and those which can be overlapped or 
discarded and then combine the clusters together in the same class. 
5. Continue this till all clusters are taken into consideration. 
6. Create next class and goto step 1. 
Algorithm 2: Deriving Security Device Placement
 
1.  Begin 
2. Create a sorted list ( , ,…, ) based  on descending order of | | such that Ł . 
3. Select first element  from . 
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4. Place a  level security device between the left partite  and the right partite, clusters in . In 
this the  level security can be anything ranging from single partition  pattern to multiple partition  
pattern. To simplify , x can be anything like 1,2,3,4 or 1234 or combinations of these four partition  
patterns which is described in detail in the upcoming examples. 
5. Remove all the clusters { , ,..} from ( , ,…, )  
6. Remove all the empty sets from . 
7. Goto Step 2 if  is non-empty. 
8. End. 
 
We first create a sorted list Sƍ of partite classes based on decreasing order of class size, | |, the total number of 
distinct nodes in all participating clusters in a class. Then, we procedurally select each element class, si (each 
element represents a partite class, Sx1x2..) in sequence from Sƍ and place a security device between the two partites 
of that class. After the corresponding device placement, we remove from all 
the classes, the clusters that are already considered. This process is applied continually until the list Sƍ becomes an 
empty set. In this way, for each partition  pattern k, our framework derives the optimal device placement in the 
network. Let us see few examples for the above procedure. 
Example 1
Let us implement an example for single partition pattern where k=1. Consider, the following partition equivalent 
clusters under kthpartition pattern (determined based on the partition variables) for a network of 6 nodes, (1,2, 3, 4, 5,
and 6):  = {2,3,4};  = {3,4};  = {4,5};  = {2,3};  = {2,3};  = {3} 
The associated partition classes for these clusters are as follows: = {C1, C5, C6}; = {C2, C6}; = {C3}; 
={C4, C5, C6}; = {C5, C4, C6}; = {C6}. 
Now, the different iterations of the device placement procedure are shown as follows: 
Iteration1: Sƍ(S156, S456 S546, S26, S3, S6); (1, 5,6) ᇞ{C1 C5 C6} ׽(2, 3, 4) 
Iteration2: Sƍ(S2= {C2}; S3= {C3}; S4= {C4}; S5={C4}); (2) ᇞC2׽(3, 4) 
Iteration3: S3= {C3}; S4= {C4}; S5= {C4}); (3) ᇞC3׽(4, 5) 
Iteration4: S4= {C4}; S5= {C4}); (4) ᇞC4׽(2,3) 
Here, x ᇞy denotes that the security device need to be placed between the nodes/node groups x and y. 
Following is the output of the above example from the graphviz application. It shows all the connectivity and 












Fig. 1. showing the detailed connectivity and partition pattern of example 1.
Example 2
Let us implement another example for single partition pattern where k=2 i.e. IPSec. Consider, the following 
partition equivalent clusters under kthpartition pattern (determined based on the partition variables) for a network of 
4nodes, (1,2, 3 and 4): 
 = {3, 4};  = {4};  = {1};  = {2, 3}; 
38   Santosh Kumar Majhi and Sunil Kumar Dhal /  Procedia Computer Science  78 ( 2016 )  33 – 39 
 
The associated partition classes for these clusters are as follows:  
= {C1, C2}; = {C2}; = {C3}; = {C4}; 
Now, the different iterations of the device placement procedure are shown as follows: 
Iteration1: Sƍ(S12, S4, S3, S2); (1, 2) ᇞ{C1,C2 } ׽(3, 4) 
Iteration2: Sƍ(S4, S3); (4) ᇞ{C4 } ׽(2,3); Iteration3: Sƍ(S3); (3) ᇞ{C3 } ׽(3, 4) 
Here, x ᇞy denotes that the security device need to be placed between the nodes/node groups x and y. 
Following is the output of the above example from the graphviz application. It shows all the connectivity and 
security device placement of the required pattern. IPSec tunnel is required to be placed between the nodes to carry 













Fig. 2. showing the detailed connectivity and partition pattern of example 2.
4. Implementation and Evaluation 
4.1. Setup 
Here for our algorithm the platform can be either Windows or Linux, but we have done it in Windows environment. 
The maximum number of nodes that the algorithm can evaluate efficiently is 100. The algorithm is implemented in 
‘C’ language and the final visualized output is given by the Graphviz application1. Considering the combinations of 
4 partition patterns as discussed above we are generating an optimised placement of security devices and their 
respective graphs drawn by the Graphviz application. The details of the IDE (Integrated Development Environment) 
used for C, i.e. Code::Blocks and the visualization done by Graphviz is explained in below sections. 
4.2. Software used 
Before we move on with the procedure of placement of security devices, let us look at the various tools used for the 
designing output of the required network. We need a C compiler, gcc 4.3.8 version. Code::Blocks is a free C, C++ 
and Fortran IDE built to meet the most demanding needs of its users. It is designed to be very extensible and fully 
configurable. Here we have used this tool for writing, editing and compiling our required C program. The result 
produced is passed to Graphviz application for the visualization of the network along with their security devices 
placed between them. GVEdit Graph File Editor for Graphvizversion: 1.02 Graphviz: version 2.38.0. 
4.3. Time Complexity 
We evaluate the device placement with respect to Test cases and time complexity. The algorithms are evaluated 
in different test networks with varying data center network size and requirements. In addition, evaluation is done 
considering the separation pattern and offered services. We evaluate the device placement time based on separation 
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result. It has three major components: (i) separation zone creation based on similar service, (ii) Separation of class 
creation, and (iii) time for device placement. The time complexity of the both algorithms are O(N2), where N is the 
number of computing as well security nodes present in the cloud data center network. This complexity is due to the 
comparison of every pair of nodes in the data center.  Figure 4 shows the relation between device placement time 
with network size. 
4.4. Space Complexity 
The space requirements represent the memory used for solving the device placement problem. Figure 5 shows 
that the memory used linearly varies with the network size under different requirements.  
 
5. Related Work 
Several researchers has worked on synthesis and configuration of networks and enterprise networks 2, 3, 4.  There are 
few works on risk based security configuration analysis. For example, risk analysis using attack graphs have been 
proposed (in 5, 6). Others have proposed using attack graphs to find optimal deployment of security devices to block 
all attack scenarios7, 8. However there is no such significant work for cloud infrastructure. In this paper the major 
thrust is to place security devices appropriately in cloud infrastructure. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Although security architecture design usually follows well-known principles such as, partition, defense-in- depth, 
fail safety etc., but, it is still performed in an ad-hoc manner. Recently, many issues has been raised about the 
validity and optimality of the data centre security architecture when the design requires  balancing of different 
competing factors such as, partition , cost and usability. Therefore, generating a usable and optimal security 
configuration resolving the contention between the security requirements and business constraints is an important 
but challenging problem. In this paper we have presented the security configuration in cloud data centre. 
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